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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DOROTHY ELLEN MARX,
Defendant-Appellant.
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)

NO. 46206-2018
Elmore County Case No.
CR-2017-472

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issue
Has Marx failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
underlying, unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, upon the jury’s verdict finding
her guilty of felony DUI?

Marx Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A jury found Marx guilty of felony DUI, and the district court imposed a unified sentence
of five years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.359-62.) Marx filed a
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.363-66.)
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Marx asserts her underlying sentence is excessive in light of her substance abuse issues,
mental health issues, desire for treatment, support from family and friends, and purported
remorse. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.) The record supports the sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).

2

The maximum prison sentence for felony DUI is 10 years. I.C. § 18-8005(6). The
district court imposed an underlying unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, which
falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.359-62.) On appeal, Marx contends that her
underlying sentence is excessive in light of her substance abuse issues, mental health issues,
desire for treatment, support from family and friends, and purported remorse. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.3-4.) However, these factors do not outweigh Marx’s on-going criminal offending, her failure
to be rehabilitated or deterred despite prior treatment opportunities and legal sanctions, and the
danger she poses to the community.
Marx’s criminal history includes 13 misdemeanor convictions, one prior felony DUI
conviction, and four charges that were ultimately dismissed. (PSI, pp.4-8. 1) Marx’s conviction
in this case is her sixth DUI conviction. (PSI, pp.4-8.) Marx has previously been afforded
treatment opportunities, including participating in a retained jurisdiction program where she
completed Flagging, Substance Abuse Education, Cognitive Restructuring, Life Skills, Domestic
Violence, 12 step Recovery Skills, Pre-Release, and Relapse Prevention. (PSI, pp.8-9.) She also
participated in drug court while on probation for her 2011 felony DUI. (PSI, p.8.) While
participating in that program, Marx tested positive for alcohol, provided three diluted drug tests,
and admitted to drinking vanilla flavoring and “trying to dilute” her drug test but then “changed
her story.” (PSI, pp.8-9.) She finally completed drug court in 2014 and “completed her sentence
in November 2016.” (PSI, p.9.) She committed the felony DUI in this case three months later,
in February 2017. (PSI, p.9.)

1

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Confidential
Documents on Appeal Volume 1.pdf.”
3

After the jury found her guilty in this case, Marx failed to cooperate with the presentence
investigative process. The presentence investigator made several attempts to schedule Marx’s
presentence interview; however, Marx “either did not show up or could not make it” and
attributed her failure to appear to the fact that she had a warrant for her arrest and wanted to
locate care for her daughter before being incarcerated. (PSI, p.18.) Marx finally submitted a
completed questionnaire four days before the presentence report was due and requested a phone
interview, but the presentence investigator was unable to accommodate Marx’s request before
the deadline for submission of the presentence report. (PSI, p.18.) Because Marx was not
interviewed, the presentence investigator was unable to determine Marx’s LSI score. (PSI, p.19.)
Marx also failed to comply with the presentence process by not participating in a GAIN
assessment or Mental Health Review. (PSI, p.19.)
Marx claims her underlying sentence “is excessive in light of the mitigating factors that
exist in her case,” including her alcohol addiction, family support, prior diagnoses of depression,
anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder, and purported remorse. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.)
Information with respect to all of these mitigating factors was before the court at the time of
sentencing. That Marx believes the district should have elevated those considerations above the
aggravating factors—particularly her history of drinking and driving—does not show an abuse of
discretion.

The district court acted well within its discretion in concluding the mitigating

information before it did not outweigh either Marx’s demonstrated failures to be rehabilitated or
deterred or the need to protect society.
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its
decision and addressed Marx’s failure to be deterred and the need to protect society, as
evidenced by the fact that, despite having a good support network, she still chose to drive while
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intoxicated and incurred her sixth DUI conviction. (7/9/18 Tr., p.526, L.10 – p.529, L.19.) The
state submits that Marx has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set
forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its
argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Marx’s conviction and sentence.

DATED this 17th day of April, 2019.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of April, 2019, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.
__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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be rewarded or supported in filing legal
documents. With that I will submit.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, as I indicated I am
treating it just as a letter of support.
MR. KORMANIK: Understood, Your Honor.
Thank you.
THE COURT: As part of the presentence
materials.
Is there additional matters that you
wanted to mention to the court before -MR. KORMANIK: Your Honor, just as far as
the State requesting that fine of $3,000 with
1,500 suspended, plus court cost, plus PD
reimbursem ent. As the Court is aware from the
presentence report, Ms. Marx's employment is
limited to nonexistent in her ability to pay that
fine and PD reimbursement is significantly
curtailed. We would object to the restitution for
the State's expert. I don't think that is covered
by the restitution statute. So we would object to
that.
Other than that, Your Honor, that is
all I have. Unless you have any other questions?
THE COURT: No. Thank you.
MR. KORMANIK: Thank you very much, Your

1 Honor.
2
THE COURT: Ms. Marx, I will hear anything
3 that you want to say at this time.
4
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I just would
5 like to apologize.
6
THE COURT: Thank you. Is there any legal
7 cause why judgment should not be imposed?
8
MS. LOTT: Not the the State's knowledge.
9
MR. KORMANI K: No, Your Honor.
10
THE COURT: As was suggested by counsel for
11 the defendant the Court should, among other
12 things, consider the factors outlined in great
13 detail i n the case of State versus Toohill, and I
14 have done that. And I really think ultimately the
15 most important factor in this case is protection
16 of society.
17
I think the defendant has, I am going
18 to say objectively shown, that deterrence is not a
19 significant consideration in view of the fact that
20 this is her sixth conviction of driving while
21 intoxicated. And as to whether or not it would be
22 some type of deterrence to people similarly
23 inclined, I doubt that. So I really t hink this is
24 a case of how do we protect society?
25
The way to do that is twofold. One by
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a prison sentence and two by suspension of driving
privileges. As far as the prison sentence is
concerned, I am going to -- I am willing to give
the defendant a fina l chance to prove that she
could be put on probation at some point. So I am
going to retain jurisdiction in this matter.
I feel an appropriate disposition of
this case would be a five-year sentence, with two
years fixed, three years indeterminate with the
Court retaining jurisdiction in the case. I know
the defendant has already done a previous retained
jurisdiction. However, just to make sure she
fully understands what this means, it means that
you will go to prison.
Within one year of today's date you
will have a fina l hearing before the Court. I
don't know whether it will be in front of me or a
different judge. But in any event, at that time
the Court will make a final determination of
whether or not it feels you are an appropriate
person to be put on probation or whether you
should simply serve out the balance of your
sentence. There is no guarantee that you will get
probation, but there is that possibility. You are
going to have to convince two entities that you

09/29/2018 09:07 :20 PM
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are a good candidate of probation. First, the
department of corrections. And second, the judge
who will be handling the final decision.
As far as driver's license suspension
is concerned, I am going to impose a five-year
driver's license suspension. And I know there are
some provisions for a restricted license at some
point. You can certainly ask for that. I don't
want to prejudge things too much, but the
likelihood of you getting a restricted license
from me are very slim. I wont say none, but I
would say very slim objectlvely considering your
record.
As far as the issue of fines, court
costs, restitution, I think the best thing to do
on those -- with respect to those matters is to
wait until the final hearing that you have. So I
am going to hold those in abeyance. It is my
understanding t hat you are entitled to credit of
four days having been served in this matter. I
will give you credit for four days toward the
fixed portion of the sentence.
Just a few comments. You know, there
are a lot of people who have said very nice things
about you and feel that you have a chance for

Page 525 to 528 of 531

Page 190

APPENDIX A – Page 1

138 of 140 sheets

530

529
1
2

3
4

5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

rehabilitation. I hope that they are right and
that that really Is a possibility in the future.
And I think it is commendable that you have so
many people who are willing to support you.
Having said that, nevertheless, this is
your sixth conviction of driving while
intoxicated. The State is entitled to be
protected from you. That is why you are getting
the sentence you are getting.
If you are dissatisfied with the
Court's decision you have the right to appeal to
the Supreme Court within 42 days. If you want to
appeal and can't afford a lawyer one can be
appointed for you at state expense. You will be
taken into custody at this time.
As far as I am concerned it is a
five-year absolute suspension. If the defendant
wants to petition for something else at some time
in the future that is up to her.
Counsel, is there anything else you
want to take up at this point?
MR. KORMANIK: No, Your Honor. I wlll
maintain possession of the PSI -THE COURT: That is fine.
MR. KORMANIK: -- pending the final
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disposition.
THE COURT: Sure. Thank you.
2
MR. KORMANIK: Thank you, Your Honor.
3
MS. LOTT: Thank you, Your Honor.
4
5
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(Hearing concluded.)

7
8

9

10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

Page 529 t o 530 of 531

Page 191

APPENDIX A – Page 2

09/29/2018 09:07:20 PM

